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 NOTE 
The Supreme Court of Missouri Splashes 
with Precedent in Waterslide Injury Case 
Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, 450 S.W.3d 291 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
JOE KRISPIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Amusement park rides generally offer patrons a fill for their thrill-
seeking desires.  In addition to roller coasters and spinning wheels, a popular 
ride during the summer months is the waterslide.  Waterslides come in sizes 
appropriate for all ages, but some modern day waterslides have reached ex-
traordinary heights, some reaching over eight stories high.1 
As the slides grow taller, the importance of operator care and prudence 
also becomes greater.  Water sliders place their lives in the hands of water 
park operators as they allow their bodies to descend freely down a slick slide, 
propelled along by rushing water.  Not only are operators in total control of 
the rate at which the water propels patrons down the slides, but they are also 
in control of the implementation of safety warnings, safety harnesses, and 
other detailed factors that contribute to the water slide’s overall safety.  Pa-
trons expect the waterpark operators to exercise enough caution and care to 
ensure their safety as they plummet down the plastic flume with minimal 
control over their bodies’ movements. 
Many waterslides come in different shapes and sizes, but a legal ques-
tion remains about the appropriate standard of care to which water park slide 
operators should be held.  Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held that when determining the appropriate standard of care to which 
amusement park operators should be held, courts should consider the particu-
lar circumstances surrounding the amusement.2  Subsequently, courts held 
that some situations required the operator to exercise merely ordinary care; 
other situations, particularly situations in which the operator exercised com-
 
* B.A., B.S., Truman State University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2016; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I thank 
Professor Doug Abrams for his assistance on this Note.  I also thank my wife, Mary 
Krispin, and my parents, Paul and Nancy Krispin, for their constant support.  Finally, 
I thank God for all of the wonderful opportunities He has blessed me with. 
 1. See Verrükt – World’s Tallest Waterslide!, SCHLITTERBAHN WATERPARK, 
http://www.schlitterbahn.com/kansas-city/rides/all-new-verruckt (last visited Jan. 30, 
2016). 
 2. Berberet v. Elec. Park Amusement Co., 3 S.W.2d 1025, 1029 (Mo. 1928). 
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plete control over an amusement park ride, required the application of the 
highest degree of care.3 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Missouri shook up this area of law in 
Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP.4  The court appeared to abandon the original and 
longstanding method of reviewing the particular circumstances surrounding 
the amusement park ride and replaced it with a seemingly per se rule that 
amusement park operators need to exercise only ordinary care.5  This decision 
is sure to change the outlook of personal injury cases involving large and 
dangerous amusement park rides. 
This Note reviews the legal history of amusement park operator liability 
in Missouri, discusses the application of that law to a recent incident involv-
ing a young girl injured at a Kansas City waterpark, and analyzes the various 
applications of the law made by the Supreme Court of Missouri, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals, and the dissenting Supreme Court of Missouri judges.  This 
Note concludes by discussing relevant public policy concerns. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Twelve-year-old Jessica Chavez was enjoying a summer afternoon with 
her family at Kansas City’s Oceans of Fun Water Park in 2000.6  Chavez and 
her family decided to ride down Hurricane Falls, a giant water slide in which 
four riders share a circular raft and descend down the 680-foot flume.7  The 
only safety feature on the raft was a nylon strap that ran across portions of the 
top of the tube.8  Additionally, there was no way for patrons to control the raft 
as it proceeded down the slide.9  The raft’s descent was affected by several 
variables, including the raft’s rotation, the contact made with the walls of the 
slide, and “the contour of the layout of the ride.”10  Expectant mothers, pa-
trons with spinal, muscular, or skeletal issues, and persons shorter than forty-
six inches tall were cautioned not to ride this water slide.11 
After receiving a verbal instruction to “hold onto the straps at all times,” 
Jessica Chavez and her family descended together down the large waterslide 
on their raft.12  As the raft made the final turn, Chavez’s mouth and her 
 
 3. See McCollum v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 59 S.W.2d 693, 697–98 (Mo. 
1933); Gromowsky v. Ingersol, 241 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951); Cooper v. 
Winnwood Amusement Co., 55 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932); Brown v. 
Winnwood Amusement Co., 34 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931). 
 4. 450 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 293. 
 9. Id. at 292–93. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 293. 
 12. Id. 
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cousin’s head collided, causing Chavez to bleed and lose a tooth.13  As a re-
sult of the accident, Chavez needed extensive dental work and lost two more 
teeth.14 
Chavez then filed suit against Cedar Fair, LP, the corporate owners of 
Oceans of Fun.15 The petition alleged negligence by: “(1) failing to provide 
friction devices reasonably sufficient to prevent a raft rider from colliding 
with another rider and (2) failing to adequately warn of the risk of harm from 
colliding with other raft riders.”16  At trial, there was conflicting testimony as 
to whether Chavez and her cousins had voluntarily or involuntarily let go of 
the safety strap.17  In addition, both parties called expert witnesses to testify 
about whether Cedar Fair took adequate measures to ensure passenger safety 
on Hurricane Falls.18 
The trial court instructed the jury to apply the highest degree of care 
standard to determine Cedar Fair’s possible liability.19  Specifically, the jury 
was told to determine whether Cedar Fair exercised “that degree of care that a 
very careful person would use under the same or similar circumstances.”20  
Cedar Fair objected, arguing that the ordinary standard of care instruction 
was appropriate.21  The trial judge overruled the objection, and the jury 
awarded Chavez $225,000.22  Cedar Fair appealed, alleging that the trial 
judge applied the wrong standard of care in the jury instruction.23 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District affirmed the 
verdict.24  In an unpublished opinion,25 the court relied on four early-
twentieth century decisions to hold that the highest degree of care was appro-
priate in this case.26  The court held that Cedar Fair should be held to the 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 293–94. 
 23. Id.  Cedar Fair also appealed on account of the trial judge refusing to instruct 
the jury on comparable fault.  Id.  That issue was barely discussed in this case because 
it was dependent on the issue of whether the appropriate standard of care was given.  
Id. at 301.  Additionally, that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 24. Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD75373, 2013 WL 3660372, at *1 (Mo. Ct. 
App. July 16, 2013), rev’d, 450 S.W.3d 291. 
 25. The opinion was unpublished because the case was transferred to the Su-
preme Court of Missouri before its scheduled publishing in the South Western Re-
porter.  See MO. CONST. art. V, § 10. 
 26. Chavez, 2013 WL 3660372, at *2–5 (citing McCollum v. Winnwood 
Amusement Co., 59 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Mo. 1933); Gromowsky v. Ingersol, 241 
S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951); Cooper v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 55 
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highest degree of care because it had complete control of the water slide, 
riders completely depended on Cedar Fair for their safety, and Cedar Fair did 
more than merely construct the slide.27 
The case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which re-
versed and remanded for a new trial that would apply the ordinary standard of 
care.28  The court reasoned that the highest standard of care is reserved for 
persons using inherently dangerous materials, common carriers, and automo-
bile drivers.29  The court also rejected the appellate court’s distinction be-
tween waterslide builders and waterslide operators and instead made all 
waterslide injury suits subject to the ordinary standard of care.30  Two judges 
dissented, arguing that the court should have applied the highest standard of 
care because Cedar Fair had complete control over the water slide.31 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
One of the first Missouri decisions to apply the common law rules of 
negligence to amusement parks was Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co. 
in 1928.32  In Berberet, the fifty-seven-year-old plaintiff fell on some loose 
floorboards on a boardwalk and sustained injuries while meeting her son as 
he exited a merry-go-round.33  After the trial court awarded the plaintiff 
$2500 in damages, the defendant appealed, arguing that the plaintiff had 
failed to state a claim.34  Specifically, the defendant challenged the plaintiff’s 
petition for not alleging sufficient facts to show that the defendant had failed 
to exercise ordinary care.35 
The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed and reversed the trial court’s 
judgment.36  The court relied on several decisions to determine the factors 
and considerations for deciding which standard of care applied to amusement 
park proprietors.37  As the court stated, 
[T]he care required of the proprietor of a place of public amusement is 
that which is reasonably adapted to the character of the exhibitions 
given, the amusements offered, the places to which patrons resort, and 
also, in some cases, the customary conduct of spectators of such exhi-
 
S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932); Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 34 
S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931)). 
 27. Id. at *5. 
 28. Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 296. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 298. 
 31. Id. at 301. 
 32. 3 S.W.2d 1025 (Mo. 1928). 
 33. Id. at 1027. 
 34. Id. at 1026. 
 35. Id. at 1029. 
 36. Id. at 1030. 
 37. Id. at 1029. 
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bitions.  It is a care commensurate with the particular conditions and 
circumstances involved in the given case.38 
The court held that under the factual circumstances of Berberet, the ap-
propriate standard was the ordinary degree of care because the boardwalk was 
similar to ordinary property that the owner has a duty to keep reasonably 
safe.39  Since the petition failed to allege that the defendant should have 
known of the loose floorboard, the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant 
breached its duty to exercise ordinary care.40 
Three years later, in Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co.,41 a case in-
volving another amusement park accident, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
suggested applying a higher standard of care for some amusement park inci-
dents.42  The plaintiff was injured when the rollercoaster on which she was 
riding made an unexpected “jerk,” causing severe injuries to her hip and 
side.43  After a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $2500, the de-
fendant appealed.44 
Brown’s main holding concerned the application of the res ipsa loquitor 
doctrine, but the appellate court discussed the appropriate standard of care to 
which the amusement park operator should be held: 
There have been several cases before the higher courts of this country 
involving devices similar to the one in the case at bar and, while the 
courts have been slow in holding that the operator of such devices 
(roller coasters) is technically a common carrier and that all the rules 
governing such carriers are applicable to him, they do hold that the 
rule in reference to the degree of care required of a common carrier 
applies to the operation of such devices . . . .45 
The court equated the duty of amusement park operators with that of a 
common carrier.46  Rather than ordinary care, the standard of care for a com-
mon carrier is “the greatest possible care and diligence.”47  The court gave 
very little explanation, but it stated that because the amusement park operator 
has complete control over the device being used to transport riders from one 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 34 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931). 
 42. Id. at 152. 
 43. Id. at 151. 
 44. Id. at 150. 
 45. Id. at 152 (citing Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 68 So. 417 (Ala. 
1915); Pontecorvo v. Clark, 272 P. 591 (Cal. 1928); O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park 
Co., 89 N.E. 1005 (Ill. 1909); Bibeau v. Pearce Corp., 217 N.W. 374 (Minn. 1928); 
Sand Springs Park v. Schrader, 198 P. 983 (Okla. 1921)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Sawyer v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 37 Mo. 240, 260 (1866). 
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destination to another, the common carrier standard – the highest degree of 
care – should apply to amusement park operators.48  Subsequently, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the verdict.49 
The next year, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision to hold 
amusement park operators to the highest standard of care.50  In Cooper v. 
Winnwood Amusement Co., the plaintiff was riding a rollercoaster in which 
the restraining mechanism failed to keep the plaintiff secured to her seat.51  
At the bottom of a long descent, the plaintiff, who at that time was hovering 
over a foot above her seat, was slammed back down to her seat by the force 
of the ride, causing significant injury to the lumbar region of her back.52  The 
jury found the amusement park liable and awarded the plaintiff $15,000.53 
On appeal, the amusement park, relying on Berberet, alleged that the ju-
ry instruction holding it to the highest degree of care was in error, and that the 
ordinary degree of care was all it was required to exercise.54  The appellate 
court rejected that argument, relying on Brown and finding support from a 
leading civil law treatise.55  The court specifically held that “the operators of 
such devices [amusement park rides] are required to use the highest degree of 
care for the safety of their passengers.”56  The court dismissed the defendant’s 
other claims of error and affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.57 
Not a year had passed before Winnwood Amusement Company was 
sued again for injuries sustained at its amusement parks.58  This time, the 
appeal reached the Supreme Court of Missouri.59  In McCollum v. Winnwood 
 
 48. Brown, 34 S.W.2d at 152. 
 49. Id. at 154. 
 50. Cooper v. Winnwood, 55 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932). 
 51. Id. at 739. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 740. 
 54. Id. at 742 (quoting Berberet v. Elec. Park Amusement Co., 3 S.W.2d 1025, 
1029 (1928)) (“The rule in this state, and generally, is that the proprietor of a place of 
public amusement owes to his patrons that duty which, under the particular circum-
stances, is ordinary care or reasonable care for their safety.”). 
 55. Id. (quoting 10 C.J. 609, § 1035) (“The owner and operator of a scenic rail-
way in an amusement park is subject, where he has accepted passengers on such rail-
way for hire, to the liabilities of a carrier of passengers generally.”).  See also 30A 
C.J.S. Entertainment and Amusement § 104 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (“[I]n the case 
of inherently dangerous devices the owner or proprietor must, like a common carrier, 
use the highest degree of care for the safety of the patrons consistent with the practi-
cal operation of the business, as with respect to such amusement devices as scenic 
railways or roller coasters, and amusements of like type.  The operator of such devic-
es owes the care which the most prudent person would be expected to exercise under 
similar circumstances.”). 
 56. Cooper, 55 S.W.2d at 742. 
 57. Id. 
 58. McCollum v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 59 S.W.2d 693, 693 (Mo. 1933). 
 59. Id. 
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Amusement Co., the twelve-year-old plaintiff was injured when attempting to 
slide down the defendant’s waterslide.60  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged, 
[The slide] was constructed and maintained in a faulty and defective 
manner in that the top . . . was not of sufficient length and size to 
properly admit plaintiff’s body . . . and so particularly because of its 
limited space to receive the body of a user without coming in contact 
with the open balustrade . . . .61   
The plaintiff’s leg rose beyond the edge of the slide and smashed into 
one of the slide’s supporting pipes, which caused her femur to break.62  The 
amusement park argued that the plaintiff’s own negligence caused the injury 
by purposefully causing her body to reach above the sides of the slide, possi-
bly by riding the slide while sitting on her brother’s back.63  The plaintiff 
denied that accusation, claiming the incident occurred at the top of the slide.64  
The jury believed the plaintiff’s story and awarded her $10,000.65 
The defendant appealed, claiming that the evidence showed that the 
plaintiff’s version of the story was physically impossible.66  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri did not agree, deferred to the jury’s determinations of cred-
ibility, and speculated that the plaintiff could have been injured at the top of 
the slide.67  However, the court also determined that the plaintiff’s older 
brother must have been contributorily negligent under the circumstances, and 
that the jury’s instruction which did not mention contributory negligence was 
in error.68 
The court devoted one sentence to the appropriate standard of care, rely-
ing on Berberet: “[The] principal instruction, the only one authorizing a ver-
dict for plaintiff, very properly told the jury that defendants in operating . . . a 
place of public amusement owed the patrons the duty of using ordinary or 
reasonable care for their safety . . . .”69  The court did not mention or discuss 
the recent developments in Brown or Cooper, which held amusement park 
operators should be held to the highest standard of care, probably because the 
standard was not a contested issue in this case.70  The court instead focused 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 694. 
 62. Id. at 696. 
 63. Id. at 694. 
 64. Id. at 695. 
 65. Id. at 694. 
 66. Id. at 695. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 696–97. 
 69. Id. at 697.  The Chavez court relied heavily on this sentence, even though it 
was uncontested in McCollum.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, 450 S.W.3d 291, 295 
(Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 70. See generally McCollum, 59 S.W.2d at 697. 
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on the issue of the slide’s construction.71  Under the facts of the case, the 
court determined that the jury should have been instructed to determine 
whether the slide was negligently constructed.72  The court remanded for a 
trial with jury instructions that: (1) contemplated the presence of multiple 
people on the slide and (2) considered any negligence in constructing the 
slide.73 
Nearly twenty years passed before a Missouri court decided the next 
important amusement park case, Gromowsky v. Ingersol, in 1951.74  The 
plaintiff was riding the “airplane ride,” a swinging device suspended from a 
sixty-foot tower by heavy cables, at the defendant’s amusement park.75  A 
cable snapped and the plane suddenly fell, causing an iron bar to violently 
strike the plaintiff’s back.76  Under the theory of res ipsa loquitur, the jury 
awarded the plaintiff $4500 for the negligence claim.77 
After quickly dispensing of the defendant’s weak argument that res ipsa 
loquitur should not apply, the Missouri Court of Appeals moved on to the 
issue of the appropriate standard of care.78  The defendant argued that the jury 
instruction applying the highest degree of care was erroneous and mislead-
ing.79  The court disagreed, strictly relying on Brown’s holding that it was not 
error to instruct the jury that amusement park ride operators must be held to 
the highest degree of care when the device is “under the sole and exclusive 
care, operation, supervision, control and maintenance of the defendant[].”80  
The court determined that the highest standard of care was the appropriate 
standard for the amusement park operator and affirmed the judgment for the 
plaintiff.81 
The Chavez opinion from the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western 
District was not published, but it is worth mentioning how the court discussed 
the legal principles derived from Berberet, Brown, Cooper, McCollum, and 
Gromowski.82  Rather than dismissing the prior appellate court decisions in 
Brown, Cooper, and Gromowski – because of the Supreme Court of Missouri 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 697–98 (“The jury should have been required to find not only that the 
slide in question was in fact constructed and operated in the condition mentioned, but 
that such construction was negligence, that is, such that a reasonably careful and pru-
dent person would not have constructed and operated it in that condition.”). 
 73. Id. at 698. 
 74. 241 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951), abrogated by Chavez, 450 S.W.3d 291. 
 75. Id. at 61. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 62. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 63. 
 81. Id. at 64. 
 82. Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD75373, 2013 W.L. 3660372 (Mo. Ct. App. 
W.D. July 16, 2013), rev’d, 450 S.W.3d 291 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
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decisions that reached different results – the Court of Appeals synthesized 
and distinguished all five cases.83 
First, the court mentioned that Berberet involved an injury sustained 
from loose footing on a boardwalk in an amusement park.84  Unlike the four 
following cases, Berberet did not involve an injury sustained while actually 
riding on an amusement park ride.85  Rather, Berberet appeared more similar 
to a premises liability claim than to a negligent operation claim.86 
Then, the court emphasized that, even though Berberet applied the ordi-
nary standard of care, the court actually held that the appropriate standard of 
care must be determined by the particular circumstances.87  The court provid-
ed a small list of factors to consider when determining the appropriate stand-
ard of care: (1) “the character of the exhibitions given”; (2) “the amusements 
offered”; (3) “the places which patrons resort”; and (4) “the customary con-
duct of spectators of such exhibitions.”88  Most importantly, Berberet stated 
that the appropriate standard of care must “commensurate with the particular 
conditions and circumstances involved in the given case.”89  In Berberet, the 
dangerous condition was a part of a boardwalk, not an amusement park ride, 
so the standard of ordinary care was appropriate.90 
The court then examined the specific circumstances of the four deci-
sions that followed Berberet.91  In Brown, Cooper, and Gromowski, the plain-
tiffs alleged negligent operation of the amusement park ride on which they 
were injured.92  The court emphasized that the defendants in those cases had 
sole control over the amusement park rides, and that the plaintiffs had “turned 
their safety over to the care of the operator.”93  Therefore, the court found it 
appropriate to apply the highest standard of care in those three decisions.94  
On the contrary, the plaintiff in McCollum primarily focused on the negligent 
construction, rather than negligent operation, of the defendant’s waterslide.95  
The court determined that McCollum was really a premises liability case, 
similar to Berberet, and therefore appropriately applied the ordinary standard 
of care.96 
 
 83. See id. at *2–5. 
 84. Id. at *4 (citing Berberet v. Elec. Park Amusement Co., 3 S.W.2d 1025, 1028 
(Mo. 1928)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (citing Berberet, 3 S.W.2d at 1028). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (quoting Berberet, 3 S.W.2d at 1029). 
 89. Id. (quoting Berberet, 3 S.W.2d at 1029). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (citing Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 34 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1931)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at *5. 
 96. Id. 
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The Western District then determined that the incident involving Jessica 
Chavez was most like Brown, Cooper, and Gromowski and held that the 
highest standard of care should be applied against Cedar Fair.97  The court 
determined that since Hurricane Falls was under Cedar Fair’s complete con-
trol, the highest standard of care was appropriate.98  The court concluded that 
the jury instructions were properly given and denied Cedar Fair’s point of 
appeal.99  However, the cause was transferred to the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, pursuant to Article V, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution.100 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that McCollum was binding, be-
cause it was decided after Brown and Cooper and was decided by a higher 
court than Gromowsky.101  Rather than synthesizing the four decisions as the 
appellate court had, the Supreme Court of Missouri applied McCollum broad-
ly, holding that the ordinary standard of care always applies to water slide 
accidents.102 
The court began by explaining that the highest standard of care is ap-
plied in only a few circumstances, such as common carriers, firearms users, 
and motor vehicle drivers.103  The court then stated that McCollum “rejected 
the highest degree of care standard for amusement park operators,” even 
though that court’s opinion never mentioned that standard of care.104  The 
court noted that although the standard of care was not an issue, McCollum’s 
decision to apply the ordinary standard of care was consistent with Berberet 
because both cases involved amusement parks.105  The court then, without 
going into much detail, listed a series of decisions that applied the ordinary 
standard of care in amusement or quasi-amusement park settings.106 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, 450 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 101. Id. at 295. 
 102. Id. at 295–96. 
 103. Id. at 294.  Specifically, the court mentioned the instances where the highest 
standard of care is applied: “[(1)] common carriers, . . . ([2]) electric companies; ([3]) 
users of explosives; ([4]) users of firearms; and, ([5]) motor vehicle operators.”   Id. at 
296. 
 104. Id. at 295; see generally McCollum v. Winnwood Amusement Co. 59 
S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1933). 
 105. Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 295. 
 106. Id. (citing Gold v. Heath, 392 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1965) (merry-go-round); 
Boll v. Spring Lake Park, Inc., 358 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1962) (swimming pool); Hud-
son v. Kan. City Baseball Club, 164 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1942) (baseball stadium); Lew-
is v. Snow Creek, Inc., 6 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (ski operator); Schamel v. 
St. Louis Arena Corp., 324 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (ice rink)). 
10
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After reviewing instances in which the highest standard of care has been 
applied in Missouri,107 the court discussed Brown, Cooper, and 
Gromowski.108  While reviewing the facts of those cases, the court reiterated 
that Brown and Cooper were decided before McCollum.109  The court also 
took issue with the fact that Cooper and Gromowski relied so heavily on 
Brown’s language, which it considered dicta, and also criticized all three 
opinions for not offering sufficient reasoning for why the highest standard of 
care was appropriate.110  
Next, the court declined to synthesize and distinguish the five decisions 
as the Missouri Court of Appeals had.111  The court construed McCollum as a 
negligent operation case, rather than as a negligent construction or premises 
liability case.112  The court then stated that even if McCollum were a premises 
liability case, Chavez’s case would be too because of the similarities of the 
two claims.113  The court made no mention of Berberet, let alone the language 
suggesting that the appropriate standard of care should be determined by the 
surrounding circumstances.114 
Finally, the court explained stare decisis and declined to add amusement 
park operation to the short list115 of instances in which the highest standard of 
care could apply.116  The court determined that Hurricane Falls was not a 
common carrier because its primary purpose was entertainment and the water 
ride had a height restriction.117  The court also did not consider Hurricane 
Falls as inherently dangerous as electric companies, explosives, guns, or 
cars.118   Though the court recognized that some dangers are associated with 
amusement park rides, the court opined that those dangers do not rise to a 
level where the ordinary standard of care would not be appropriate.119  There-
fore, the court determined that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to 
 
 107. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  The court also described in-
stances where the highest degree of care is appropriate like with activities “so inher-
ently or extremely dangerous, with such a risk of widespread injury, that the law re-
quire[s] higher protection.”  Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 296. 
 108. Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 296. 
 109. Id. at 297–98. 
 110. Id.  Ironically, McCollum, the case used for support by the court, provided 
even less reasoning when justifying the application of the ordinary degree of care.  
See McCollum v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 59 S.W.2d 693, 697–98 (Mo. 1933); 
supra note 69. 
 111. Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 298. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 116. Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 299. 
 117. Id.  The court indicated that a distinguishing characteristic of a common 
carrier is that it accepts all comers.  Id. 
 118. Id. at 300. 
 119. Id. 
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apply the highest standard of care against Cedar Fair.120  The judgment was 
reversed, and the cause was remanded for a new trial.121 
Judge Teitelman authored a brief dissenting opinion, in which Judge 
Draper joined.122  First, the dissent emphasized the fact that Cedar Fair invit-
ed its patrons to ride the giant water slide.123  Additionally, the dissent ob-
served that Cedar Fair exercised complete control of Hurricane Falls as its 
owner and operator.124  Those considerations led the dissenting judges to the 
conclusion that a higher standard of care was appropriate under these circum-
stances.125 
The dissent then shed light on the ruling in Berberet and stated, “while 
amusement park proprietors generally owe patrons a duty of ordinary care, 
the general rule yields to the specific activity at issue.”126  The dissent 
acknowledged that Chavez alleged that her injuries were caused by Cedar 
Fair’s negligent operation of Hurricane Falls, and that Chavez was “depend-
ent on Cedar Fair for her safety because Cedar Fair controls the slide.”127  
Under those circumstances, the dissent would have applied the highest degree 
of care and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.128 
V.  COMMENT 
It is interesting that the Supreme Court of Missouri relied so heavily up-
on McCollum, which was in line with Berberet, yet overlooked Berberet’s 
fundamental holding.  Rather than applying a per se ruling that amusement 
park operators need exercise only ordinary care, Berberet held that the appro-
priate standard of care must be determined based on the “particular conditions 
and circumstances.”129  Berberet even provided a small list of factors to con-
sider when determining the appropriate standard of care.130  However, Chavez 
rejected three holdings where the conditions and circumstances indicated that 
the highest standard of care was appropriate.131  Furthermore, Chavez appears 
to preclude the application of the highest standard of care against any 
amusement park operator, regardless of how much control the operator exer-
cises and how dependent upon the operator amusement park patrons are for 
their safety and well-being. 
 
 120. Id. at 301. 
121 Id. 
 122. Id. (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 301–02 (citing Berberet v. Elec. Park Amusement Co., 3 S.W.2d 1025, 
1029 (Mo. 1928)). 
 127. Id. at 302. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Berberet, 3 S.W.2d at 1029. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 298–99. 
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While Hurricane Falls certainly is not a common carrier, the public poli-
cy interest in holding common carriers to the highest degree of care is also 
applicable to rides like Hurricane Falls.  Patrons rely on the amusement 
park’s operators for their health and safety when they partake in amusement 
park rides.  Similar to common carriers, amusement park ride operators have 
nearly complete control over the instrumentality carrying its patrons. 
In exchange for an entrance fee, the amusement park operator must en-
sure the safety of its patrons on its rides, especially when the patrons are 
placed helplessly within the sole control of the amusement park’s instrumen-
tality.  The amusement park operator does not transport its patrons between 
significant locations like the common carrier, but the same public policy in-
terests in holding the operator, who has nearly complete control over the in-
strumentality, to the highest standard of keeping its patrons safe also apply. 
It would be unfortunate to preclude the application of the highest stand-
ard of care merely because of the technical definition of a common carrier.  
As the Supreme Court of Missouri pointed out, Hurricane Falls fell outside of 
the traditional definition of a common carrier, because the primary purpose 
for patrons to use amusement park equipment is entertainment, and there is a 
height restriction.132  However, despite those factors, patrons are still entrust-
ing their health and safety to the operator of a dangerous, moving instrumen-
tality.  While patrons participate in amusement park rides for thrill and ex-
citement, patrons do not anticipate a risk of actually sustaining physical harm.  
Furthermore, the operator exercises complete control over the ride.  As such, 
the giant, dangerous water slide’s operator should be held to the highest 
standard of care, despite how much fun fully grown people are allowed to 
have on the ride. 
It is difficult to understand how the same standard of care is applied to 
the operator of a 680-foot water slide, whose riders have minimal control of 
their movements, and the owner of an ordinary boardwalk within the park.  
Despite the clear differences in type and character of the two circumstances, 
amusement park operators need be only as careful with people wildly de-
scending down the giant, slippery waterslide as they are with people walking 
across a boardwalk.  Yet, that is the result reached by this court, relaxing the 
standards of the park operators who have sole control over the instrumentality 
in which thrill-seekers regularly place their lives. 
In some ways, the application of the highest degree of care in automo-
bile cases133 can be instructive as applied to amusement park accidents.  In 
both instances, the injured party suffered harm from an instrumentality that 
was under the complete control of another.  Also, the injured person had re-
lied on the other party to take care to control its instrumentality for the sake 
 
 132. The Chavez court pointed to precedent defining a common carrier as a mode 
of transport open to “everyone who asks.”  Id. at 299 (citing Balloons Over the Rain-
bow, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 427 S.W.3d 815, 826–27 (Mo. 2014) (en banc)).  Thus, 
a hot air balloon operator who exercised discretion regarding which passengers could 
fly was not a common carrier.  Id.  
 133. MO. REV. STAT. § 304.012(1) (2000). 
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of the injured person’s safety.  Unlike the owner of a boardwalk, both 
amusement park operators and automobile drivers exercise complete control 
over a dangerous instrumentality, and those nearby rely on the diligence of 
those in operation of the dangerous machines for their safety.  The analogy is 
not foolproof, but it likely provides more guidance than the comparison to the 
owner of a boardwalk. 
It could be understood if the court applied the test laid out in Berberet 
and determined that Hurricane Falls was a safe enough ride to only warrant 
the application of ordinary care.  Unfortunately, the court made no mention of 
such a test.  Instead, the court seems to have suggested that amusement park 
operators always need to exercise only ordinary care.  As technology advanc-
es and the thrill-seeker’s appetite requires more daring and risky amusement 
park rides, one hopes that ride operators will be expected to exercise more 
care than what is expected of an ordinary person. 
It appears now that no matter how strongly the particular conditions and 
circumstances indicate that a higher standard of care is appropriate, amuse-
ment park operators need exercise only ordinary care as they control poten-
tially dangerous rides and devices.  Regardless of how much dependence 
patrons surrender to amusement park ride operators for their safety, those 
operators will not be required to be any more careful than an ordinary person.  
Though the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on Berberet when it decided 
Chavez, only Berberet’s result survived this opinion.  With little explanation 
from the court, the reasoning and fundamental holding seem to have been lost 
to the history books and dissenting opinions. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Berberet, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that an amusement 
park operator should be held to the ordinary standard of care when operating 
common pathways and boardwalks along the premises.134  However, the 
court acknowledged that other circumstances could arise within amusement 
parks that would require the amusement park operator to exercise a higher 
degree of care.135  Although the appellate courts that decided Gromowski, 
Cooper, and Brown did not provide a thorough analysis of their reasoning 
behind applying a higher standard of care, those decisions were instances 
where courts determined that the particular circumstances surrounding the 
plaintiff’s injury warranted the application of the highest standard of care.136 
Similar to the plaintiffs in those three cases, Jessica Chavez was riding 
an amusement park ride that was completely under the control of the amuse-
 
 134. Berberet, 3 S.W.2d at 1029. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Gromowsky v. Ingersol, 241 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951); Cooper v. 
Winnwood Amusement Co., 55 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932); Brown v. 
Winnwood Amusement Co., 34 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931). 
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ment park operator, Cedar Fairs.137  Chavez had no control of her raft’s de-
scent and was completely dependent on Cedar Fair for her well-being and 
safety as she voyaged down the 680-food water slide.138  Rather than exiting 
Hurricane Falls with feelings of adrenaline and excitement, Chavez left Cedar 
Fair’s ride with a mouthful of blood, a three-tooth gap in her smile, and sub-
stantial medical bills.139 
Despite clear language in Berberet requiring courts to consider the par-
ticular circumstances of the amusement park’s operations, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri applied a per se rule holding amusement park operators to the 
ordinary standard of care from two fact-specific decisions.140  Berberet al-
lowed courts to apply different standards of care based on different amuse-
ment park instrumentalities,141 but Chavez holds operators of extravagantly 
large and heart-pounding thrill rides to the same standard as the operator of a 
simple pathway.142  Surely amusement park patrons would want the amuse-
ment park to be more careful as it operates a giant winding waterslide than 
when it operates its walkways.  Unfortunately, Chavez does not distinguish 
between these circumstances, instead choosing to lump all particularities 
within amusement parks into the same category.143  Chavez appears to indi-
cate that the operator of the most dangerous ride in the country will be held to 
the same standard of care as the operator of the safest children’s rides. 
For as much as Chavez rejected the plaintiff’s arguments as contrary to 
stare decisis, it is concerning that the court omitted any discussion of the 
process established in Berberet for determining the appropriate standard of 
care.144  The public policy behind holding common carriers to the highest 
standard of care should also apply to amusement park rides where patrons 
completely depend on the operator for their safety and the operator has total 
control over the instrumentality. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri should at least have considered reasons 
why the operation of Hurricane Falls, pursuant to Berberet’s holding, may 
necessitate a higher standard of care than ordinary reasonableness.  Instead, 
the court established a per se rule for amusement park operators, resulting in 
a law that essentially states that no matter how large, dangerous, and control-




 137. Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 293. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Berberet, 3 S.W.2d at 1029. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Chavez, 450 S.W.3d at 299. 
 143. Id. at 296. 
 144. Id. at 294. 
 145. Id. at 295–96. 
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